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I. DIRECTION AND THEORY IN CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS
TIE JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL STYLE
JOHN M. MAXI*
INTRODUCTION

On May 3, 1947, a new Japanese constitution came into effect, some
fifty-eight years after the promulgation of Japan's first modern constitution on February 11, 1889. The 1889 Constitution was one product
of Japan's headlong, almost desperate, and successful drive toward
modernization in the nineteenth century; the 1947 Constitution was
the result of a military occupation, a climactic consequence of a crushing defeat in an aggressive war.
The 1889 Constitution established an essentially absolutist form of
monarchy based on the concept of imperial sovereignty; however, it
did possess some features which, although not unqualifiedly democratic, under different circumstances might have led the nation in the
direction of democracy. Unfortunately for Japan it was the absolutist
features that colored the constitutional system and favored the rise of
the authoritarianism of the 1930-1945 period. The 1947 Constitution
was quite consciously designed not only to eliminate the base of the
authoritarianism of the immediate past, including the doctrine of imperial sovereignty, but to provide the basis for a thoroughgoing democratic system founded on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
The 1889 Constitution was an outgrowth of both the requirements
and the realities of Japanese society in the critical formative stages of
modernization. The 1947 Constitution appeared in a society already
modernized, but suffering from the trauma of a military defeat and the
near-shattering strains and stresses created by the impact of a military
occupation on an already severely dislocated nation.
It would appear to be a constitutional truism that a viable constitution must be in accord with the nation's history, tradition and socio*Vice-Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Massachusetts; B.A.,
1932, M.A., 1936, University of Washington; Ph.D., 1948, Harvard University.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43 : 893

political values. If so it should be equally true that the operational
effectiveness of a constitution can be measured by the degree to which
the letter of its provisions is transformed into the operations of the
institutions, relationships and processes established and governed by
that fundamental law and by the extent to which the society has developed a general awareness of the instrument and the system created and
controlled by it. Constitutions differ in form, content and theoretical
underpinnings as the societies that produce them differ. In like manner, the integration of a constitution into a society is controlled by the
totality of the operations of that society. The manner and the form of
this integration constitute what may be referred to as "constitutional
style."
This examination of Japan's constitutional style is based on the
manner in which the following factors have contributed to its development or have become elements of it: past constitutional history, the
broad reaction against militarism and authoritarianism, basic constitutional principles, the renunciation of war, the electoral system, the
structure of government, the relationship between the government and
the people, education and the mass media, the intellectuals, changing
social relations, popular controversy and the issue of revision. The
conclusion will be that the 1947 Constitution has been firmly woven
into the general institutional framework of Japanese society and will
endure. Even so, neither the Constitution nor the constitutional style
will be immutable; embedded in Japanese society they will change as
the society changes.
A caveat is appropriate here. The following discussion of the Japanese constitutional style might easily lead the casual reader to conclude that all Japanese are fully aware of the Constitution, familiar
with its content, and actively involved in a pervasive and continuous
dialogue on constitutional issues. Such a conclusion would be inaccurate for there is an unquestionable lack of a universal popular consciousness of the Constitution and problems related to it. This is
simply a Japanese example of a condition observable in all political
societies, including those which take pride in a high degree of political
literacy. To summarize: the existence of a constitutional style as a
general phenomenon of society is entirely possible even in the absence
of a constitutional sense in a considerable proportion of the population.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE
POSTWAR CONSTITUTION

A. Early History and the 1889 Constitution
Although the 1947 Constitution is innovative, perhaps revolution-

ary, Japan has had substantial experience with both quasi and real
constitutional systems. Formal written constitutions, in the modern
sense, were not a part of Japan's political history. As early as 604 A.D.
what became known as the 17-Article Constitution of Prince Sh6toku
was promulgated.1 However useful this may have been as a fundamental -set of moral and quasi-legal principles to govern political and
administrative relationships at a time of considerable domestic ferment, by no stretch of the imagination could it be regarded as a constitution in the modern sense. During the succeeding twelve centuries
of Japanese political and governmental development the country operated under what might be regarded as an unwritten constitution,
though its elements changed with the passage of time. The principal
features of this quasi-constitutional system included: the location of
sovereignty in the imperial throne, no matter how powerless or inactive
its occupant might be in government or politics; the office of skigun,
the supreme military authority who ruled in the name of the emperor;
the elaborate court bureaucracy modelled on that of T'ang China; the
political and governmental institutions of Japanese feudalism from the
twelfth century onward; and, climactically, the elaborate governmental
structure of the Tokugawa period.'
Had Japan generated a complex of social, cultural and historical
forces to lead its feudal and traditional society into a type of modernization paralleling that of the western world in the last half of the
nineteenth century, its pre-modern quasi-constitutionalism might have

been adapted to the requirements of a nonfeudal Japan. But that did
not occur. The opening of the country in 1853-1854 through the estab'Though long attributed to Prince Sh6toku, this "Constitution" is currently regarded by Japanese scholars as having been written after his death. See 1 G. SANSom, A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334 51-52 (1958). Sansom has also written a long
analysis of this constitution: The First Japanese Constitution: A Lecture by Sir
George Sansom (published in pamphlet form in 1938 by the Asiatic Society of
Japan). A shorter discussion appears in K. ASAHcAWA, THE EARLY INSTITUTIONAL
LIF- OF JAPAN 252-56 (1963).
- For a clear, concise description of government in
Tokugawa Japan, see Hall,
The Nature of Traditional Society: Japan, in POLITIcAL MODERNIZATION IN JAPAN

AND TURKEY ch.2 (especially 20-27) (R. Ward & D. Rustow eds. 1964).
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lishment of formal treaty relations with the United States and the
dramatic overthrow of the Tokugawa regime in 1867-1868 required
that Japan, like it or not, embark on the momentous course toward
modernization-a course whose content and form was to be determined by societies and forces far outside the stream of Japan's historical continuity.
By 1880 the dictates of political and governmental modernization
and the pressures of domestic politics forced the leaders of Japan to
make a momentous decision: to draft and promulgate a written constitution.' Establishment and operation of a centralized, bureaucratic
state (modern by the standards of the 1880's), creation of a basic set
of rules to govern the new game of politics brought into being not only
by internal political changes but also by injection into the country of
new political ideas, attitudes and practices, and response to the demands for a broader sharing of political power all seemed to require
that Japan adopt a written constitution. Such an instrument would
also be a visible mark of political modernization.
Although the decision in favor of a written constitution was made in
1880, the Constitution itself was not promulgated until 1889. The
delay was due to: (1) the deliberate decision of the leaders to monopolize the constituent process in order to insure the framing of an instrument that would conform as closely as possible to what they regarded as an ideal Japanese instrument and that would permit only a
limited sharing of political power; and (2) the more obvious fact that
the drafting of a document for which there was no precedent in Japanese history required the study of existing constitutional systems in
other parts of the world.
Promulgated on February 11, 1889, the Constitution created an
absolute monarchy based on the location of sovereignty in the emperor, the concept of imperial sovereignty giving the instrument a
firm foundation on Japanese tradition. Although the Constitution established executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government, there was no true separation of powers and certainly no system
of checks and balances. Although the wording of the Constitution was

'J. PITTAU, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EARLY MEIJI JAPAN: 1868-1889 (1967), is the
best account in English of the constitutional movement, the process of drafting and
the development of the emerging constitutional thought of the times. G. AKITA,
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN MODERN JAPAN:

1868-1900 (1967)

covers some of the same ground; however, Akita is more concerned with the politics
of constitutional government than with constitutionalism itself.
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somewhat ambiguous on the point, both authoritative commentary 4
and subsequent practice demonstrated beyond doubt that the three
powers of government were to be regarded as simply facets of the
unitary imperial sovereignty. It was this ambiguity which provided
the basis for domination of the governmental process by the executive
branch, a consideration that almost automatically led in the direction
of full-fledged authoritarian government some decades later.
As a decided innovation, the 1889 Constitution also enumerated certain fundamental freedoms for imperial subjects such as the freedoms
of speech, religion, assembly and association. However, the Constitution provided that all of these freedoms could be exercised only
"within the limits of the law." As a result the Constitution provided
no limits on the government's power to restrict any freedom enumerated in it. Thus, although there was never an absolute denial of freedom even in the darkest period of authoritarian government during the
Second World War, there was likewise never an unimpeded freedom to
criticize and challenge the government, or indeed the system as it
developed under the 1889 Constitution.
Between 1889 and 1930, the development of Japan's government
and politics was a blend of the authoritarian elements characteristic of
the Constitution-especially the absolute sovereignty of the Emperor
and the restrictions on freedom-and ameliorative practices leading in
the direction of an at least modified democratization. Ironically, both
the authoritarian and the democratic streams were constitutional in the
sense that neither came into direct conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Between 1930 and the end of the Second World War the
absolutist tenor of the Constitution and the authoritarian currents in
Japanese society prevailed and resulted in a thoroughgoing authoritarianism most pointedly expressed in militarism at home and aggression
abroad. In a very real sense, both militarism and authoritarianism in
Japan were constitutional because no provisions of the 1889 Constitution were suspended or violated.
Because the 1889 Constitution was a true constitution, a characteristic constitutional style developed as the manifestation of its integration into the society. Certainly authoritarianism and militarism were
the principal elements of that style, but there were other features as
well: "emperor worship," or perhaps more accurately, acceptance of
'H. IT6, COMMENTARIES O r THE CONSTITUTION OF THE Emp OF JAPAN (M. It
transl. 1889). This book is essential for an understanding of the Meiji Constitution. To reprint it would be an important contribution to scholarship.
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the ideas of unquestioning obedience to and sacrifice for the Emperor
and the throne; ultranationalism; supremacy of the state over the
individual; and rejection of anything that smacked of democratic liberalism, socialism or communism. This constitutional style can be
described by the single world, kokutai, usually translated "the national
polity," but used to denominate the uniquely fapanese sentiment of
nationality and the structure of the state centering around the imperial
institution and, in effect, including all the elements listed above.'
B. The 1947 Constitution
When the Second World War ended with the defeat and collapse of
the old system, it immediately became clear that the victorious allies
led by the United States were determined to uproot both militarism
and authoritarianism. The existing system was to be replaced by a
new and radically different constitutional framework which would
"conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic selfgovernment." 6 It soon became apparent that the pre-existing constitutional system and style were to be subjected to intense pressure.
The story of the drafting of the present constitution is extremely
complicated and, even though a massive amount of testimony and evidence has been accumulated, controversy still rages. 7 For present purposes a general outline will provide useful guidelines while avoiding
the possibility of debate over details. As early as October, 1945, barely
a month after the signing of the surrender documents, General Douglas MacArthur, in his capacity as Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP) in charge of the occupation of Japan, notified Prime
Minister Kijur6 Shidehara that complete revision of the 1889 Constitution would have to be given top priority by the Japanese Government. From then until early February, 1946 the Japanese Govern'For an excellent brief account of kokutai, see J.
EARLY MEIJI JAPAN, 1868-1889 (1967). S.
STITUTIONAL LAW (1940), is an analysis

PITTAU,

POLITICAL THOUGHT 12,"

FujiI, THE ESSENTIALS OF JAPANESE CONof the Meiji Constitution from the standpoint of the kokutai concept, though the concept is not specifically dealt with. J.
REED, KOKUTAI: A STUDY OF CERTAIN SACRED AND SECULAR ASPECTS OF JAPANESE
NATIONALISM (1940), is an account of the manner in which the concept was woven
into the emergent chauvinism and ultranationalism of the mid-1930's.
'The quoted phrase is taken from the statement of the ultimate objectives of U.S.
policy toward the defeated Japan as stated in United States Initial Post-surrender
Policy for Japan, 18 DEP'T STATE BULL. 423 (1945), which has been frequently reprinted.
'See Professor Takayanagi's article on the Commission on the Constitution for a
summary statement of the opposing views on the origins of the Constitution, infra this
symposium at 961. The sub-committee of the Commission which investigated the
process of enactment met 49 times with the minutes of these meetings totalling just
over 3,000 double-column pages.
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ment worked on the problem and submitted several proposed drafts
for a new constitution to the occupation authorities. However, General MacArthur and his advisers felt that the proposals adhered too
closely to the old Constitution. Finally, in February of 1946, the
Government Section of SCAP secretly prepared its own draft. Early
in March, this draft was released by the Japanese government as its
own. Although both the occupation and the Japanese government
strove to maintain the fiction that the draft was a Japanese product, it
was an open secret that it was not.
After several extensive revisions of the original draft carried out in
close cooperation by GHQ, SCAP and the Japanese government, the
document was presented to the Imperial Diet in June of 1946 to initi-"
ate.the formal revision of the 1889 Constitution. The new document
was dealt with as if it were simply an extended revision of the old one,
thus maintaining a recognizable degree of constitutional continuity.
After extensive and detailed debate the House of Representatives approved the new Constitution on August 24, 1946. The draft was then
sent to the House of Peers where it was approved on October 5 after
slight amendment. The lower house then approved the amended draft
on October 7. On all three occasions the overwhelming majority voted
approval.8 The Constitution was then formally promulgated on November 3, 1946, by the Emperor and became effective on May 3, 1947.
It was perfectly clear that the circumstances under which the Constitution was framed, enacted and promulgated were abnormal. One of
the most important circumstances is the undeniable fact that the constituent process was carried out while Japan was under military occupation. Because the Japanese government acknowledged that the
"authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, ' the country was both in fact and
under law not sovereign. The other major circumstance was the clear
fact that the occupation did play a role (no matter how obscure some
'GOVERNMENT
SECTION, SUPREME COMMANDER
CAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN: SEPTEMEER 1945

TO

FOR THE: ALLIED POWERS,

SEPTEMBER

POLITI-

1948 111 (1949) (U.S.

Government Printing Office), states that the final vote in the House of Peers was
298 to 2 and 342 to 5 in the House of Representatives. However, careful research by
both Japanese and American scholars has failed to yield verification of these figures.
There was apparently no roll call vote. The two negative votes in the House of Peers
were apparently attributed to the two members who spoke against the draft; the five in
the lower house to members (four of them communist party members) who stated
that they voted negatively.
'For a detailed statement on the relationship between the occupation and the Japanese government see Part II of United States Initial Post-surrender Policy for
Japan, 18 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 423 (1945).
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of the details might have been) in determining the content of the
instrument. These circumstances have led many Japanese to be highly
critical of many specific provisions of the Constitution and, even more
importantly, have constituted a powerful argument for those who advocate a thorough revision of the present Constitution. I shall deal
with these issues from time to time in the remainder of this essay.
To understand both the nature of the new Constitution and the constitutional style based on it, a brief examination of its three basic animating principles is necessary: renunciation of war, guarantee of fundamental human rights, and popular sovereignty. The simple enumeration of the principles reveals the vast difference between the 1889
and 1947 constitutions, and the revelation in turn highlights the
"alien" nature of the new fundamental law.
Strictly speaking, renunciation of war is not a constitutional principle. It has nothing to do with the problem of sovereignty; it is only
indirectly related to the structure of government and to basic political
relationships; and it has no direct bearing on the relationship between
government and the governed. But it is a constitutional issue of paramount importance in Japan; and, consequently, it is a distinctive
feature of the Japanese constitutional style. It will be a recurrent
theme in this discussion. Article 9, setting it forth, reads as follows:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 10
One of the great constitutional controversies in Japan centers
around how and why this article happens to be in the Constitution."
Difficult as it may be to resolve the controversy, two facts are selfevident: it is in the Constitution because Japan lost a war to an allied
coalition whose principal member, the United States, was determined
that Japan was to be prevented from waging offensive war in the
"0Translations of the Constitution have appeared
books. The translation relied on in this article is in
CONSTITUTION

OF JAPAN AND CRI-INAL STATUTES

in many
MINISTRY

English-language
JUSTICE, THE

OF

(1958).

One side of the controversy holds that Article 9 was imposed on Japan by the
victorious allies; the other holds that it originated from Prime Minister Shidehara.
Professor Takayanagi in his article in this symposium presents a reasoned case for
the latter view, infra at 961.
"
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future, and it has remained in the Constitution because a majority of
the Japanese people warmly supports it.
The principle of popular sovereignty replaces the doctrine of imperial sovereignty of the 1889 Constitution. It is the foundation on
which the constitutional structure is erected. In spite of its central
significance, the Constitution deals only lightly with it. In the preamble, the following statement appears:
We, the Japanese people... do proclaim that sovereign power resides
with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is
a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the
people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the
people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people.
In the body of the Constitution, there is only a single and incidental
reference to popular sovereignty. Article 1, dealing with the position
of the Emperor, reads as follows:
The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the
people, deriving his position from the will of the people, with whom resides sovereign power.
This is not the place to discuss the highly technical problem of the
nature of popular sovereignty. However, from this concept stem such
highly important and diverse constitutional provisions as: the guarantee of fundamental human rights; the position of the Emperor; guarantees for the accused under criminal procedure; legislative supremacy; the relationship between the legislative and executive branches;
the role of the judiciary; local government; and the amendment
process.
Though the people have replaced the Emperor as the locus of sovereignty, he enjoys a constitutionally defined position. However, he is
now only a "symbol" and other provisions of the Constitution deny
him "powers related to government" and restrict him to the formal
performance of only specifically enumerated "acts in matters of
state" (Articles 4, 6 and 7).
It is the principle of popular sovereignty which is the foundation for
the broad and firm integration of the people into the political process
and for the guarantee against state interference in their rights and
freedoms. We shall see in considerable detail how both the principle
and its application are essential parts of the constitutional style.
The importance of the principle of the guarantee of fundamental

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43 : 893

human rights is underlined by the fact that almost a third of the Constitution, thirty-one of a total of 103 articles, is devoted to it. Among
the broad range of political rights and freedoms are the following:
the freedoms of thought, conscience, assembly, association, religion,
choice of occupation and residence; academic freedom; equality under
the law; universal adult suffrage; and the right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively. In addition, the Constitution
guarantees the following social rights: freedom from discrimination in
"political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex,
social status or family origin"; marriage based on mutual consent of
the partners; equality between the sexes in such civil matters as choice
of spouse, property rights, inheritance, divorce and other family matters, the right "to minimum standards of wholesome and cultured
living"; and equal education correspondent to ability. Finally, articles
31 through 40 contain guarantees of the rights of the accused before
the courts.
In striking contrast to the 1889 Constitution, the 1947 Constitution
recognizes no formal abridgement on the enjoyment of rights and freedoms. However, Article 12 does contain an abstract restriction, stating
that the people should "refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and
rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public
welfare." Although there has been a degree of controversy, as might
be expected, over the meaning of the public welfare, this generalized
restriction has not prevented the enjoyment of rights and freedoms.' 2
C. Summary and Appraisal
A review of Japan's constitutional history prior to 1945 and of the
circumstances under which the present constitution was framed and
promulgated, and a summary of the principles and content of the
current constitution clearly demonstrate that twenty years ago
Japan's Constitution was not only completely out of tune with the
former constitutional style, but with its own society. Indeed, at that
time its salient characteristic was its alien nature. The fact that the
constituent process had been carried out under a foreign military occupation was perhaps the most patent expression of its alien cast. It
seemed divorced not only from the constitution it replaced, but from
the country's history, tradition and value system. The consensus, at
'See
Lawrence W. Beer's article in this symposium for a detailed discussion of
the doctrine of the public welfare, infra at 1095.
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home and abroad, was that the new fundamental law could be viewed
most charitably as a noble, but naive, experiment and least charitably
as a ruthless imposition of the will of the victor on that of the vanquished. Critical in the development of the new constitutional style
was that both the spirit and the content of the Constitution, in spite of
their alien origin, turned out to meet requirements of a Japanese soci-:
ety involved in a crisis of redirection and adjustment. The rapid
development of the constitutional style was a manifestation of the
speed of general change in Japanese society after 1945.
As we have seen, two central features of the old constitutional style
were authoritarianism and militarism which the occupation was determined to eliminate from Japan. To do so was a natural goal for occupation policy-primarily American-because both had been a threat
not only to the United States, but also to Japan's Asian neighbors and,
indeed, to the peace and security of the world. What was not so apparent when the Second World War ended was that the great majority of
the Japanese people ardently desired to see authoritarianism and militarism extirpated from their society. Not only is the rejection of militarism and authoritarianism a key aspect of the new constitutional
style, but it is also one of the strongest currents in popular thought
and feeling. To understand this is to understand much about postwar
Japanese government, politics and society.
The reason for the deepseated aversion to militarism and authoritarianism is simple: the depth of the traumatic experience suffered by the
Japanese people between 1931, the year of the Manchurian Incident
which was the opening chapter of the Second World War, and 1945,
the year of the A-bombs. The catastrophe of Japan's shattering experience with war engulfed almost all adult Japanese. A review of its
principal features shows why there had been a society-wide revulsion
against the historical experience with militarism and authoritarianism
and an equally wide commitment to bar their return: hundreds of
thousands of military and civilian casualties at home and abroad; the
disruption of patterns of family life by mobilization, the evacuation of
cities, and the shifting of workers; the destruction of family property
and family resources directly and indirectly by military action; the
destruction or draining away of untold national treasure; the destruction of cities and industrial installations of all kinds; near-starvation,
malnutrition, illness and disease born of war and its consequences; the
collapse of the dream of empire; the complete discrediting of both
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military and civilian leadership; the destruction of the old concept of
the national destiny; and the collapse of a system of government and
politics deemed not only superior but permanent.' 3 In addition, there
was an awareness that Japan's acts abroad had made both the country
and the people hated and despised, an awareness sharpened by the
fact that the Japanese themselves accepted the correctness of the
world's judgment of what the nation had done. This awareness led
many Japanese to reject their own immediate past and the leadership
responsible for it; but more importantly it inspired them to embark on
a course that will hopefully guarantee that, by no act of its own, will
Japan become involved in a war that will visit such disaster on them
again.
Coming as it did less than half a year after the end of the war, Article 9 even in the first draft constituted a dramatic renunciation not
only of war itself, but of Japan's own policies and actions, indeed, of
Japan's still very recent past. Moreover, for many Japanese it represented at least partial atonement, and a consequent easing of the conscience, for the sins of the government and its armed forces against
Japan's neighbors. Additionally, it was regarded by the Japanese as a
pledge to themselves and the rest of the world not to return to the
past. The psychological role of Article 9 in the Japanese consciousness
was further enhanced by the fact that Japan was the first major nation
to include such a far-reaching renunciation in its basic law. From the
beginning there was also the hope that Japan's action might constitute
an example for the rest of the world to follow. Article 9 has been for
the Japanese far more than a simple constitutional provision; more,
even, than a renunciation of war. This distinctive feature of the constitutional style is a central element of a newly reconstituted Japanese
nationalism.
The reaction against authoritarianism was not as clearcut as that
against militarism. Its impact was neither as broad nor as direct because it came in the narrower and less directly experienced area of
politics. As in the case of militarism, the occupation was determined to
end the authoritarian system not only because it was regarded as undesirable in itself but also because it was inextricably woven into the old
militarism. Here, too, there was an immediate and effective welcoming
"3One of the best short accounts of the impact of the allied attack on Japan is
MORALE DIVISION, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, THE EFFECTS OF
STRATEGIC BoMBING ON JAPANESE MORALE (1947)
(U.S. Government Printing Office).

This is only one of numerous reports prepared by USSBS on the effects of strategic
bombing, but it deals the most directly with the effects on the general population.
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response from within Japan, not from the generality of the population,
but from those who had openly or covertly opposed authoritarianism.
Imprisoned, driven underground or forced into acceptance of the
authoritarian regime, it was this group who suffered the most at the
hands of the militarists and their supporters and who were most keenly
aware of what their society had suffered. Their reaction was twofold:
warm endorsement of the elimination of the authoritarian regime and
even warmer support of the new democratic, constitutional order that
was being created to fill the vacuum.
The rejection of authoritarianism plays a dual role in the constitutional style: it keeps the politically conscious alert to any contemporary trend that seems even remotely to resemble authoritarianism; and
more importantly, it is the driving force behind the wholehearted support of the present system, especially the guarantee of fundamental
human rights, as the best means of preventing the recrudescence of
any variation, old or new, on the theme of authoritarianism.
What gave strength and viability to the 1889 Constitution and provided the distinguishing features of its constitutional style was its continuity with the historial past-particularly, imperial sovereignty.
What has contributed broadly to the strength and viability of the 1947
Constitution is a general determination to support and maintain a
discontinuity between Japanese society, which is generating a new
course of development, and the traditional order which has been rejected.
II.

POLITICAL AND GOvERNMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE
JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL STYLE

To describe and analyze the Japanese constitutional style is to examine the manner in which the principles and provisions of the 1947
Constitution have developed an interactive relationship with the ongoing processes of Japanese society over the past twenty years. The
concern of the remainder of this essay will not be with society and its
fundamental law as abstractions, but with the manner in which human
beings, as individuals and in groups, have become directly involved in
the constitutional process. Two measures of the degree of effectiveness
of any democratic constitutional system, no matter what its national
stripe, are the enjoyment of freedom and the involvement of the population in the political process through the free exercise of the right of
suffrage. These closely related considerations are manifestations of the
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principle of popular sovereignty. They also affect the relationship between the government and the people under democratic constitutionalism and the structure of government itself. The ensuing examination
of the political and governmental aspects of the Japanese constitutional style will constitute an approach to some broader aspects of that
style.
A. The Extent to Which GuaranteedFreedoms are Actually Enjoyed
A critical measure of democracy is the degree to which constitutionally guaranteed freedoms are actually enjoyed. Since the country regained sovereign control over its affairs in 1952, Japan has enjoyed a
level of general freedom that is close to the maximum attainable under
any system of democratic constitutionalism. No political party or
organization is outlawed. All people are free to assemble and to associate as they choose, barring only a threat to the safety of others. The
mass media function with perfect freedom; there is nothing resembling
the stringent censorship of old. There is no issue that cannot be publicly discussed. The power of the state has not been used to impose
general abridgements on civil liberties.
What I am describing here is not a state of perfect freedom, but a
general level of freedom. As mentioned above, the constitutionally
recognized standard of the public welfare has been applied in individual cases to the freedom of speech where it was exercised in the
vaguely defined areas contiguous to libel and obscenity. But the alert
exercise of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of expression has
preserved the high level of freedom in general.
Democratic Japan has certainly not been free of threats to its freedom. But the test of performance has demonstrated beyond question
that the Japanese are acting simply as if they are what they are,
namely, free citizens under the umbrella of a constitution that guarantees them the right to all the fundamental freedoms. Thus, a major
constituent element of the Japanese constitutional style is the observable and demonstrable enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.
Whatever the difficulties may be in any attempt to determine either
the meaning or the shape of the practical application of the doctrine of
popular sovereignty, it is clear that to possess any meaning at all it
must include a guarantee of universal adult suffrage exercisable in free
elections. Only with this guarantee can the generality of a population
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possibly express the yea-or-nay political judgment of their political
leadership free from direct intervention or control of governmental
authority.
Article 15 of the Constitution guarantees universal adult suffrage.
This constitutional guarantee was the culmination of the development
of the electoral process in Japan over a period of almost sixty years.
The first national election, for the House of Representatives of the old
Imperial Diet, was held in 1890. Originally suffrage was granted only
to males with certain property qualifications. It was not until 1925
that property qualifications were eliminated, after having been progressively lowered, and universal male suffrage established. Japanese
women were not enfranchised until the spring of 1946, under a directive.issued by the occupation.
Universal adult suffrage is granted for the election of all public officials. The Japanese electoral system involves balloting for members of
the two houses of the National Diet, prefectural governors, mayors and
cities, towns and villages, and members of prefectural, city, town and
village assemblies. The Japanese electorate enthusiastically discharges
its responsibility for exercising the suffrage. The national elections
capture the most voter interest with the proportion of those actually
casting ballots averaging slightly under seventy-five percent of the
number eligible. If popular participation in the electoral process is an
indication of a going democratic political system then Japan has one.
Of equal importance is the fact that all of the elections have been
free; that is, without governmental control or interference in either the
election campaigns or in the outcome of individual contests.
A well-known phenomenon of Japanese party politics is the so-called
one-and-a-half party system. 4 Because this system is a critical political issue, it is also a feature of the constitutional style. Since the end
of the war a succession of conservative parties has controlled the general elections. The dominant Liberal Democratic Party, established in
1955, has regularly won just under two-thirds of the seats in the Diet
and until recently a majority of the popular vote. It has been confronted by a group referred to by the Japanese as the progressive
parties-the Japan Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party and

" For a brief description of the one-and-a-half party system, see R.
J. MASTTMI, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 53 (1962).

theme of this book is an analysis of the system.
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the Communist Party.' 5 These parties have consistently won a combined total of just over one-third of the seats in the lower house. Their
minority position is weakened because they will not combine into a
unified opposition, principally for ideological reasons. However, in the
January, 1967 general election they garnered some forty-four percent
of the popular vote, with the Japan Socialist Party gaining just over a
third of all votes. The Liberal Democratic Party obtained just under
forty-nine percent of the popular vote."
The one-and-a-half party system has meant not only that the opposition parties have been at a decided disadvantage, but that a true twoparty system has not yet developed because there has not been a transfer of power from one party to another through the electoral process.
The frustration of the Japan Socialist Party has sharpened its confrontation with its conservative adversary, notably in the great political
crisis of 1960 over the United States-Japan security treaty. Political
tension developed to such a point that many feared for the continuation of the system of constitutional democracy in Japan; yet it withstood the shock.
Even though the failure to develop a two-party system may be politically undesirable, even to the point where it might create tensions that
might adversely effect the constitutional system itself, the issue is
political, not constitutional. In other words, the solution of the problem can be worked out within the framework of the present constitutional order without the necessity for constitutional change. However,
the one-and-a-half party system must still be regarded as a feature of
the Japanese constitutional style because constitutional issues are consistently involved in the discourse between the conservative majority
and its minority opposition.
B. The FormalStructure of Government
A constitution, of necessity, establishes the general structure of government and sets forth the principal functions and responsibilities of
its major branches. It is the conversion of these constitutional provisions into actual operation that results in the emergence of an identifiable governmental style as a part of the broader constitutional style.
"A. COLE, G. TOTTEN & C. UYEHARA, SOCIALIST PARTIES IN- POSTWAR JAPAN
(1966), is an excellent account of both the socialist movement and the parties since
1945.

R. SCALAPINO, TIIE JAPANESE CO2M1MUNIST MOVEMEINT 1920-1966 (1967),

is the

definitive work dealing with the Japanese Communist Party. No book-length study
of the Liberal Democratic Party has yet appeared in English.
" Unofficial election statistics are from the Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 31, 1967 (morning
edition).
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The formal structure of government 17 as established in Japan's
Constitution is characterized by the separation of powers, but not by
checks and balances as understood under the American system. The
result is a system of central government in which the spheres of activity of the three principal branches of government are clearly, if generally, defined, but among which exists what might be designated a
balance-of-power rather than checks and balances system.
The 484-member House of Representatives and the 250-member
House of Councillors of the National Diet make up "the highest
organ of state power" and "the sole law-making organ of the State."'
The Diet has both direct and indirect control over the national
finances. The lower house, because it is more broadly representative,
occupies a position superior to that of the upper house. It is empowered to override an adverse upper house vote on the same bill, and in
the event the upper house fails to act on a bill, treaty, or the budget
the decision of the lower house stands as the decision of the Diet.
The Constitution provides that executive power is vested in the
Cabinet. The head of the Cabinet is the Prime Minister who must be a
member of the National Diet, designated by Diet vote, and formally
appointed by the Emperor. The Prime Minister is empowered to
appoint his ministers of state, but the Constitution requires that a
majority must come from the Diet. The Prime Minister can remove
his ministers at will. In their breadth and complexity of operation, the
twelve ministries and seven major agencies of the Cabinet constitute
an administrative leviathan comparable to that of any major contemporary government.
Finally, the Constitution provides that the "whole judicial power is
vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law. 9 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is appointed
by the Emperor, but designated by the Prime Minister, not the Diet.
Japan has a unitary judicial system; that is, all courts from the
Supreme Court, through the high and district courts, down to the
summary courts are part of a single national system administered
through the Supreme Court.20
I Brief

accounts of the organization of the Japanese government may be found in

A. Buans, THE GOVERNWENT OF JAPAN (1964); T. McNELLY, CoNTE P RARY GovERNMNT OF JAPAN (1963) and W. TSUNEISHr, JAPANESE POLITICAL STYLE (1966).
' JAPANESE Co NsT. art. 41.
JAPANESE CONST. art. 76.

'For a fairly detailed description of the Japanese judicial system see in J.
MArr, Introduction, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN, at xv. (1964).
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The Constitution clearly allocates exclusive legislative power to the
National Diet, executive power to the Cabinet, and judicial power to
the judiciary. It also explicitly states that the legislative branch is the
highest organ of state power, apparently establishing the doctrine of
legislative supremacy. Yet, in action, this constitutionally established
governmental style has undergone what appears to be significant modifications, but without apparent strain to constitutional government.
C. The Actual Operationof Government
The designation of the National Diet as "the highest organ of state
power" is strengthened by a series of other constitutional provisions
that seem to establish firmly the idea of legislative supremacy. The
Prime Minister must be a Diet member, designated by a vote of his
fellow Diet members; a majority of his ministerial appointees must
also be Diet members. These requirements constitute not only a close
linkage between the legislative and executive branches, but seem to
place the legislative branch in a dominant position. Exclusive control
over the law-making process, the power of decision over the budget,
and the power of approval of treaties seem to guarantee legislative
supremacy. In addition, the Constitution empowers the Diet to force
the resignation of a cabinet by passing a non-confidence resolution or
failing to pass a confidence resolution, provided that the Prime Minister does not anticipate such a move by dissolving the House of Representatives. Finally, the "whole judicial power" is to be exercised by
the constitutionally established Supreme Court and "such inferior
courts as are established by law." Since the Diet is "the sole lawmaking organ of the state" it would seem that the power to establish
inferior courts was another manifestation of legislative supremacy.
The actual functioning of Japanese government has resulted in a
situation in which the executive has emerged in the position of supremacy. The cause is not a willful violation of the letter of the
Constitution, but a simple manifestation of the phenomenon of executive domination in modern government.
As the modern nation-state has grown in complexity, the economic,
political, social and diplomatic problems have likewise grown vastly
more complicated; these problems now involve many individuals, require the adjustment and conciliation of demands of an ever increasing number of interest groups, and call for much more skill, to say
nothing of the expenditure of funds, to mechanically handle the human
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and material resources of the society. Japan has proved to be no
exception. The result has inevitably been a tremendobus growth in the
administrative structure, a great increase in the number of civil servants,2 1 a deeper and deeper penetration of administrative action and
hence administrative control into every corner of the land and the
society.
The weight of executive power is most obvious in the drafting of
legislation and the operations of the bureaucracy. Though the Diet is
incontestably the "sole law-making organ of the state," in actual practice the Cabinet has been the sole law-originating organ of the state.
Virtually all important legislation originates with the Cabinet and all
bills are either drafted or reviewed by the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation. The basic reason for this is obvious: the Cabinet's responsibility
for and consequent intimate involvement in the ongoing affairs of
Japanese society. An easy conclusion might be that the power to
originate legislation has become the power to make laws.
Such has not been the case. The Diet, more specifically the opposition parties, has vigorously opposed government bills on both political
and substantive grounds. In a few cases it has succeeded in killing
certain bills, in others in forcing a delay in passage until a later session.2 - In all cases the government and the majority party have been
forced to defend their positions in the best parliamentary tradition.
However, the debate has not always been confined within the limits of
either parliamentary procedure or parliamentary decorum. The same
situation exists in regards to the budget. While the Cabinet is responsible for the preparation and presentation of the budget, it must also
fight hard to justify the same both in committee and during debate.
It is impossible to understand the nature and operations of contemporary Japanese government without understanding both the past
and the present role of the bureaucracy. At the time of the creation
of the modern governmental structure (around 1870) the leaders of
the newly created nation were acutely aware of the basic importance
of a corps of trained civil servants. A modern bureaucracy was rapidly
'In 1964 the total number of government employees was 1,878,193 (including approximately 225,000 in the public corporation for telegraph and telephone, about
455,000 in Japan National Railways, about 305,000 in the postal service and about
275,000 in the Self Defense Forces), compared with 1,565,248 in 1956. See Table 265

in

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER,

1964

JAPAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK

464 (1965).

Japan's population in 1964 was 97,200,000.
'An outstanding example of the killing of a bill was the forced withdrawal of a
proposed revision of the Police Duties Execution Law in 1958. See J. MA I, GovERNMENT AND POLITICS IN JAPAN

196-97 (1962), for a brief account.
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established, which successfully carried out its basic duty of administering the affairs of government. Because it was indispensable to the
nation, because it represented an honorable career, and because it
developed as a tightly knit organization around which government
revolved, the bureaucracy became one of the dominant power groups
within the country. And because of the pervasive nature of preauthoritarian and authoritarian government in Japan, the presence of
bureaucracy was widely felt by the population.3
The occupation attempted to bring about reforms relating to the
recruiting, powers and functions of the bureaucracy. These reforms
were only partially realized and the weight of the bureaucracy in
Japanese society is still great. The predominance of the executive
function guarantees the continuation of a broad and powerful role for
the bureaucracy. It is a career service while legislators must periodically expose themselves to the perils of the electoral process. This
circumstance provides the former with a degree of continuity that
additionally supports their dominant position. The role of the executive and hence of the bureaucracy in the legislative process further
strengthens their position within the government. Finally, a significant
number of bureaucrats, retaining their bureaucratic outlook and affiliations, turn politician after retirement from government service. This
fact is widely regarded as a further inhibition on the power of the
Diet vis-4-vis that of the executive branch.2 4
Yet the power position of the bureaucracy is an uneasy one. The
bureaucracy's past history of arrogance in attitude and performance,
its role in the old authoritarianism, its remaining bureaucratic attitudes (in the invidious sense), its current role in a vast array of administrative matters relating directly and indirectly to daily life, and
its power position in government and politics have made many Japanese acutely sensitive to specific bureaucratic misbehavior as well as
general abuse of bureaucratic power. This sensitivity is neither repressed nor suppressed; it is constantly revealed in the many forms
of public discourse. However, as compared with the unhappy past, a
drastic improvement has taken place in the quality of the relations
between the government and the people, as will be discussed below.
A final question relating to intra-governmental relationships concerns the role of the judiciary, especially that of the Supreme Court.
. On the prewar position of the bureacracy see Maki, The Role of the Bureaucracy in Japan, 20 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 391-406 (1947).
- For an excellent brief account of the post-1945 role of the bureaucracy, see N.
IKE, JAPANESE POLITICS (1957). Time has not blunted its pertinence.
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Theoretically the judiciary enjoys a monopoly over "the whole judicial
power." The Supreme Court is "the court of last resort with power to
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official
act. ' 2' This would seem to place the Court in a position to overrule
acts of the "highest organ of state power" (the Diet), as well as acts
of the dominant executive branch. In fact, it has done neither.
The judiciary, however, has experienced no serious challenge to its
position from the other branches of government. The executive has
never attempted to encroach on the judicial power; and on the one
occasion when a legislative committee attempted to interfere with a
judicial decision, in an emotionally charged murder trial, the Supreme
Court strongly and successfully asserted the complete independence
of the courts.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has developed the view that
it can exercise its power to declare laws or acts of government unconstitutional only when the violation is flagrant beyond question.26 In
all other cases the Court has stated that the fault can be remedied by
legislative or political means; that is, a constitutionally ambiguous
law can be amended by the Diet ("the highest organ of state power"),
the offending cabinet minister or party can be held responsible by the
electorate, or a government can be deposed by a nonconfidence vote.
Thus, the judiciary has jealously guarded its own powers, while refusing to intrude into the areas deemed reserved to the legislature
or executive.
D. The Relationship Between the Government and the People
We have examined the structure and responsibilities of the government as constitutionally determined and have observed how the relationships between the branches of the government have evolved in
actual practice. The questions next considered examine how government is actually involved with the broad operations of Japanese society
and hence how it impinges on the daily life of the people.
To understand the relationship between the government and the
people as a component of the Japanese constitutional style it is necessary to consider both the negative and the positive aspects. The negative aspect relates to what is not present, namely, the elements of the
old authoritarian relationship that have been eliminated; the positive
JAPANESE CoNsT. art. 81.
' For a statement by the Court on this issue, see The Constitutionality wnder
Article 9 of United States Bases in Japan,in J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN
-

JAPAN

306 (1964).
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aspect relates to government services and welfare activities that have
either been vastly expanded or newly added.
As is true under any authoritarian system, executive power previously was both supreme and oppressive. The system of universal
male conscription which operated for almost three-quarters of a century exposed the majority of the male population to the training,
indoctrination and discipline typical of the garrison state. In contrast,
the Self Defense Forces are manned solely by volunteers. Total personnel amounts to less than one percent of all Japanese males. The
training, indoctrination and discipline are much looser than under the
previous system. As a result, the impact of the military establishment,
as a segment of the executive branch, on the population is negligible.2 7
Under the old order the Ministry of Education had full control over
the entire educational system, including curriculum, teachers and textbooks. Even the small number of private schools could not entirely
escape centralized control. Today the system is vastly different. Although the Ministry of Education has regained a degree of administrative control over schools on all levels, including the power to designate approved textbooks, schools and school systems enjoy great freedom from government control. 28 There is, in addition, nothing even
remotely resembling the process of indoctrination that was a central
concern of the old system.
The former Ministry of Home Affairs operated Japan's government
police system which was the main instrument for imposing authoritarian
control over the population. The old police not only maintained law
and order in the normal sense; they also carried out censorship operations-both political and moral-and functioned as a political police
controlling and suppressing activities of individuals and organizations
even remotely suspected of being subversive. The police also have
been decentralized. Although the National Public Safety Commission,
an organ of the Cabinet, has general administrative and supervisory
control over the local police organizations, there is nothing that resembles the old government police.2 9 The Constitution with its guarantees of individual freedoms and due process, new police training
" For some observations on the role of the Self Defense Forces, see Buck, The
Future of Japan's Armed Forces, 7 ASIAN SURVEY 597 (1967).
' For an excellent factual analysis of the Japanese educational system see MiisTRY OF EDUCATIOx, EDUCATION IN JAPAN: A GRAPHIC PRESENTATION (1964). For a
good analytical survey of education in Japan over the past two centuries, see H. PASSIN, SOCIETY AND EDUCATION IN JAPAN (1965).
' For a brief account of the organization of the police system, see J. MAKI, slepra
note 22, at 100-02.
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and police methods, and constant vigilance on the part of those who
suffered at the hands of or who fear a return of the old system provide
a guarantee that police activities will remain within the accepted
boundaries of the maintenance of law and order.
Finally, under the old system the administration of justice was
under the control of an arm of the executive branch, the Ministry of
Justice. The ministry was responsible for the prosecution of all violators of the law. It was also responsible for the administration of the
courts. In addition, criminal law and criminal procedure, as might be
expected under such a system, were weighted in favor of the state. As
was mentioned earlier, ten articles of the Constitution guarantee the
rights of the accused before the courts, and on that basis both the
Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure have been revised
to favor the accused.30 These changes along with the constitutional
creation of an independent judiciary have eliminated the authoritarian
and consequently arbitrary administration of justice that weighed
heavily on the people under the old system.
Article 25, paragraph 2, of the Constitution sets forth the positive
functions of the state: "In all spheres of life, the State shall use its
endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health." These considerations were by no means
ignored under the old constitutional system, any more than they can
be ignored under any operative government, but they were secondary
to and supportive of what were deemed more important matters, such
as the advancement of militaristic and nationalistic goals at home and
abroad.
The state, operating through the executive arm but on the basis of
enabling legislation and appropriations, has lived up to the above
constitutional mandate. Its operation can be observed in such concrete forms as an efficient network of public transportation; the development of highways; economic policies and practices designed to serve
the interests of economic groups (farmers, workers, and businessmen,
large and small) and to raise the general level of national prosperity
and economic well-being; the development of public housing; and all
the usual social services. Japan's system is not perfect, but it is better
than anything that the people have ever enjoyed in their long history
and comparable to those of many of the self-styled advanced nations
'For a description of the abuses under the old system which were the targets of
the revision, see Blakemore, Post-war Developments in Japanese Lair, 1947 Wis. L.

REv. 632, 649-52.
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of the West. It is under the umbrella of such benevolent policies and
practices of the government that Japanese individuals, groups and
organizations have been able to achieve their present high degree of
material comfort and well-being.
The structure, relationships and processes of government contribute
to the composition of the constitutional style because of the presence
of the following characteristics: a well-defined and sacrosanct sphere
of power for each of the three branches of government; a constitutional specification of legislative supremacy more or less negated by
the factual situation in which the executive branch is dominant; a
relationship between the governmental process and the people in which
the legislative branch is representative of the people and responsible
to the people through the electoral process, the executive branch exercises a control which on balance is benevolent, and the judicial branch
while not serving as a fighting guardian of popular rights nevertheless
protects the legal rights of the people under a guarantee of constitutional due process. In its abstention from infringement of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, in its representative nature as revealed
in the fact that it is controlled by individuals and parties who have
gone to the people in free elections to win their right to political
power and therefore control over the government, and in its operation
within defined constitutional limits, the governmental process in Japan
is democratic under any working definition of that term. This governmental process has contributed much to the distinctive nature of the
Japanese constitutional style.
III.

ASPECTS OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL STYLE

We have examined the Japanese constitutional style as it has flowed
from and been shaped by history, government, politics and the Constitution itself. The Constitution has also been woven into the society
in other areas which seem somewhat remote from constitutional concerns but which are of critical importance to the integration of the
Constitution into the national life and consciousness. An examination
of these aspects of the constitutional style follows.
A. Formaland Informal Education
The firm integration of the study of the Constitution and its meaning into the educational system is of prime importance in the new
Japanese constitutional style. On the upper levels of the academic
world there has been an explosive flowering of the field of constitu-
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tional theory. It has been estimated that in the first ten years of the
present Constitution more books on constitutional theory and commentary had been published than had appeared during the almost
sixty years of existence of the Meiji Constitution.
Japanese constitutional scholars do not simply write for each other.
Constitutional law is a required subject for students in the faculties of
law of Japanese universities. The faculties (departments) of law are
not concerned with education for the legal profession, but with the
study of law in general: the Constitution, the Criminal Code, the Code
of Criminal Procedure, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure,
and the Commercial Code. Future members of the legal professionmembers of the bar, public prosecutors and judges-are drawn from
among the best students in the faculties of law for special study at the
Legal Training and Research Institute." Also the study of law is a
near prerequisite for a civil service career and for the business profession, especially with large companies. Obviously, it is in the faculties
of law that future legal academicians get their preliminary exposure
to the serious study of the Constitution and constitutional issues. It
should be mentioned here that the overwhelming majority of constitutional scholars, both young and old, are ardent supporters of the
present Constitution.
The critical and obvious point here is that potential leaders and
all those to be engaged in key areas of public and private affairs in the
future are exposed to constitutional theory, analysis of the content of
the Constitution, constitutional judicial decisions, and other aspects
of constitutional study. Thus, they acquire an important set of attitudes relating to the Constitution and a feel for the issues of constitutionalism.
Study of the Constitution is not limited to the upper level of the
educational system. A study of the content of the Constitution, its
general nature, and even specific constitutional issues (notably Article
9) is a core feature of social studies, particularly in middle and higher
schools." Constitutional study on this level is regarded not only as
Perhaps the best English account of this Institute is Matsuda, The Japanese

Legal Training and Rearch Institute, 7 Am. J. Comp. L. 366 (1958). The author
later became a justice of the Supreme Court.
'A typical middle-school textbook is GENDAI NO SHAKAIX (Contemporary Society) (Y. Okada ed. 1967), which devotes more than half of its section on politics to a
discussion of the Constitution and matters directly related to the Constitution. A
high school textbook, SEIjE: KEizAI (Politics: Economics) (L Mutai ed. 1966),
devotes one of its three chapters to the Constitution and about a third of another to
the problem of constitutional revision.
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good in itself, i.e., as a part of the general civic education of the students, but also as part of the important task of preparing students to
take and pass entrance examinations to the universities.
The result of the attention paid to the Constitution in the educational process is not the creation of a nation of constitutional experts,
but the diffusion among the general population of an awareness of the
Constitution, the issues it raises for the people themselves, and its
significance to the kind of society in which the Japanese are living.
Beyond formal education is the informal continuing education which
comes from the daily impact of the media of mass communication.
The Constitution is news in Japan. Major constitutional judicial decisions are reported prominently and discussed editorially. Anniversaries of the Constitution are marked with news items, color stories
and roundtable discussions featuring prominent constitutional experts.
Similar attention is paid to the Constitution in radio and television.
Widely circulated journals of opinion frequently give prominent play
to constitutional articles and discussions. If a constitutional problem
of general interest arises, it is frequently dealt with in the mass circulation weekly magazines.
Thus, the Constitution is regularly before the Japanese public in
all the media of mass communication. Again, the information does
not necessarily penetrate into the consciousness of readers, listeners
and viewers to become the foundation of consciously felt attitudes;
but the mass media do contribute to the development and maintenance
of a public atmosphere in which the Constitution is an element. Awareness of the Constitution does not end with the formal years of schooling.
B. The Role of the Intellectuals
Of all the groups in Japanese society that have revealed a specific
concern with the problems of contemporary constitutionalism, the
intellectuals are by far the most important.3 3 It follows naturally
from the role of education and the mass media that teachers, professors, newspaper and radio correspondents, television and radio commentators, editorial writers, and authors of think-pieces for journals
of opinion constitute the core of the groups commonly referred to as
intellectuals. In addition, some labor union officials and political party
'2 J. Soc. & POL. IDEAS IN JAPAN (No. 1 April 1964), is devoted entirely to the
historical and contemporary role of intellectuals in Japan. See also the chapter on
the intellectuals in N. IKE, supra note 24.
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officers, scientists, technicians, writers, essayists, artists, and professional men also fall into this category. As a group, intellectuals have
demonstrated that they are positive defenders of the Constitution
being particularly alert to any danger, real or imaginary, actual or
potential, that may threaten it. Of equal significance is the fact that
they have not only commented intellectually on the Constitution but
have also plunged into the thick of the struggle. They have written
in a wide range of outlets from the most weighty of constitutional
commentaries to children's books aimed at the development of constitutional consciousness among the young; lectured in the class-room,
in public meetings and on radio and television; organized special
groups for the study and discussion of the Constitution; gone into the
streets in demonstrations revolving around controversial constitutional
issues; and become deeply involved in the politics of constitutional
revision.
It is also true that a minority of the intellectuals has played a
prominent role in the movement favoring constitutional revision. They
have been particularly interested in revision in those areas where,
according to their views, it appears to be technically desirable or
politically justifiable. Their emotional commitment, particularly to the
support of a return to a constitution that conforms more closely to
tradition as they view it, seems as strong as that of the intellectual
majority that is opposed to them. Though their antagonists among
the intellectuals charge that they are trying to destroy democratic
constitutionalism, they have in their own fashion contributed to the
broad discourse on the Constitution that has done so much to make
it alive.
The role of the intellectuals, majority and minority alike, in the
development of constitution-consciousness cannot be exaggerated.
They more than any other group have made the Constitution a living
instrument.
C. The Role of Controversy
Of great significance to the development of the Japanese constitutional style has been the role of controversy.34 It has played such a
vital role in political life because of the freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution itself. In turn the cause of freedom has been well served
by controversy precisely because so much of it has swirled about the
' See J. MAKI, supra note 22, ch. 9 for a discussion of the role of controversy in
Japan's democratic system.
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complex problems relating to the nature of freedom. The great crisis
of 1960 centered on the security arrangements between Japan and the
United States but at the same time it could not be sundered from the
meaning of Article 9. Legislation relating to the organization and
powers of the police, although it did not touch on any direct constitutional issue, raised the possibility of infringement of individual liberty
through the exercise of state power; thus the controversy directly
touched on a central issue of the new constitutional order. For some
years a political issue of relatively minor scale, that of revising the
Election Law so as to establish single-member constitutencies to replace the present multi-member system, has been under public discussion. Although on the surface this seems to be removed from any
constitutional problem, one of the central items of debate has been the
possibility that under the single-member system the Liberal Democratic Party would be able to control more than two-thirds of the Diet
seats and thus to initiate constitutional revisions. By far the longest,
most bitter, and broadest constitutional controversy has been that
raging around Article 9. Indeed, perhaps more than anything else the
controversy over Article 9 has operated to keep the Constitution in the
forefront of the national consciousness.
The controversy began to stir even during the constitutional debate
in the Imperial Diet in 1946 when questions were raised regarding its
meaning and implementation. The height of the controversy was
reached during the political crisis of 1960 over the ratification of the
security treaty with the United States in a revised form. 5
Even before the end of the occupation the Japanese government
and its leaders were squarely confronted with the problem of national
security. The unilateral renunciation of armed forces and war potential would certainly not inhibit an unfriendly nation from utilizing its
military power to achieve a political objective in its policy toward an
independent Japan. In addition, the general tensions of the cold war,
unfriendly pronouncements directed at the Japanese government from
both the Soviet Union and Communist China, pressure from the
United States government for Japanese rearmament, and the Korean
conflict a few hundred miles away forced the Japanese government
to create a new military establishment. In July, 1950, as a direct
consequence of the outbreak of the Korean conflict the occupation
told the Japanese government to establish a para-military force, the
' The
IN

definitive

work in

English
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crisis is
(1966).

ToKyo: THE SECURITY TREATY CRISIS OF 1960
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National Police Reserve, which was designed to assist the ordinary
police in the event of an internal insurrection. A few months after the
end of the occupation in April, 1952 the National Police Reserve was
replaced by the National Security Force after an intense legislative
battle. Finally, in 1954 the present Self Defense Forces were created
by law after an even more bitter battle. 6 Since then, the Self Defense
Forces, Article 9, the defense budget, defense policy, the alliance with
the United States and related items and issues regularly recur as
topics of intense parliamentary debate.
One of the most famous and significant of the Supreme Court's
constitutional decisions involved the constitutionality of American
bases in Japan. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the bases,
but pointedly refrained, because it was not at issue, from ruling on the
constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces which seem patently in
violation of both the letter and the spirit of Article 9 y
It is an essential feature of the Article 9 controversy and consequently of the Japanese constitutional style that the apparent violation
of that article by the creation and continued existence of the Self
Defense Forces has not subjected the constitutional system to severe
strain. The broad configuration of the world strategic situation,
Japan's position therein, the modest size and budget of the military
establishment, the prohibition of political activity by Self Defense
Forces members as written into the enabling legislation and adverse
public sentiment have all walled in the forces so that they have been
able to play only a very minor role in the national life and what
amounts to none at all in politics. Yet many Japanese have voiced
concern that their very existence may operate to reduce public confidence in and respect for other constitutional provisions and guarantees and hence the constitutional system itself.
As Article 9 with its highly idealistic renunciation of war has been
one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution and hence a
basic element of the constitutional style, so will the continuing controversy over it remain one of the outstanding features of the constitutional style.
D. Social Relations
Of all the provisions of the Constitution those dealing with social
" Maid, Japan's Rearmament: Progress and Problems, VIII WEST. POL. Q. 545

(1955),
Law.

contains a discussion of the major provisions of the Self Defense Forces

,, For this. decision see J.

MAI,

COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 298 (1964).
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relations seemed most unrealistic, most foreign in flavor, least in conformity with either the traditions or actual state of Japanese society
in the postwar period, and least likely to persist. Articles 13, 14, and
24 contain the principal provisions relating to the individual relations
among individuals and the relationship between the individual and
his society. Article 13 provides that all people "shall be respected as
individuals," the clearest statement in the constitution of the doctrine
of individualism. Article 14 deals with two primary issues, equality
under the law and the prohibition of discrimination "in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or
family origin." The most important provisions relating to nondiscrimination were those involving sex and social status. Twenty years
ago Articles 13 and 14 were regarded at best as being harmless statements of general principles to which obeisance had to be made as a
matter of democratic good form, and at worst as demonstrations of the
ignorant contempt of the occupation in its dealings with many elements of the Japanese social tradition.
Article 24 seemed to be even more out of line with Japanese attitudes and social values than Articles 13 and 14. It deals with the
institution of marriage, the rights of women, and the equality of the
sexes. Marriage, it states, "shall be based only on the mutual consent
of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation
with equal rights of husband and wife as a basis." It also called for
the enactment of laws relating to "choice of spouse, property rights,
inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce, and other matters pertaining
to marriage and the family" to be based on "individual dignity and
the essential equality of the sexes." In a society in which marriage
was regarded as a matter of family decision, not of the individuals
involved, and in which both law and custom impaired, if not denied,
the individual dignity of women, such provisions seemed ill-conceived,
or frivolous, or simply another humiliating heel-print of the victor on
the social fabric of the vanquished.
In the extensive revision of the Civil Code which followed the promulgation of the Constitution, these constitutional statements were
converted into concrete legal provisions. Many Japanese have professed belief that the Constitution and certain sections of the Civil
Code are responsible for unfortunate and undesirable sociological conseqtiences. The constitutional provision calling for respect of all people as individuals has in the view of many loosened the relationship
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between parents and children, thus undermining the traditional responsibility of grown children to care for their parents. The striking increase in the rate of juvenile crime and juvenile delinquency during
the past twenty years has also been laid to the reciprocal interaction
of emphasis on the individual, deterioration of the control of the
father over the children and the consequent decline of parental authority, and antisocial conduct of the young.3 8 To link constitutional
and legal provisions to certain social phenomena in a cause-effect relationship is sociologically naive, but the assertions have significantly
broadened public concern about constitutionally related problems.
It is probable that the broad social changes that have taken place
in Japan during the past twenty years would have occurred even if the
Constitution had been completely mute on the status of the individual
and the family; certainly the changes that have taken place since 1947
will not be negated nor will future change be prevented by the elimination of those provisions of the Constitution thought to be the
sources of evils or defects in contemporary Japanese society. The fact
remains however, that constitutionalism in Japan finds a source of
vitality in this ongoing debate over the relationship between the fundamental law and social change.
E. The Revision Issue
The movement for revision has been a prominent feature of the
constitutional style. The issue inevitably arose because the Constitution was drafted and enacted under a military occupation. In the
vanguard of the revisionists are the conservatives, inside and outside
the Liberal Demiocratic Party, especially those in the 50-and-over
age group. They believe that Japan should have a constitution of, by
and for the Japanese alone conforming closely to Japanese history and
tradition as they understand it. They advocate a wide range of
changes affecting: the position of the Emperor, Article 9 (to include
recognition of the "inherent right" of self defense), the language of
the document, the structure and functions of government (such as
advocating a different role for the House of Councillors, a restatement
of the principle of local government and the direct election of the
Prime Minister), the articles dealing with social relations, and the
'Older witnesses appearing at the public hearings held by the Commission on
the Constitution repeatedly expressed their concern over these problems, relating
them to the provisions of the Constitution under discussion here.
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principle of the public welfare (a broader application desired). The
breadth of discontent is obvious from this partial listing of proposals.
However, the revisionists loudly assert that they wish to maintain
unchanged the three basic principles of the Constitution, apparently
oblivious of the fact that many of the changes they advocate would
seriously modify them.
In general the anti-revisionists have adopted the view that regardless of the conditions under which the Constitution came into existence, and the degree to which its provisions or spirit may be foreigninspired or inconsistent with Japanese history and tradition, it has
brought to the Japanese people a highly desirable array of freedoms
and a democratic system that must be preserved at all costs. The
seriousness of the alleged defects in the Constitution is minimized and
said to be a small cost to pay for the great and obvious benefits.
The debate over Article 9 has been as lengthy and as pervasive as
the debate over revision in general. Constitutional theorists deal with
revision as an unavoidable issue; articles in journals, magazines, and
newspapers have appeared; books have been written on the subject;
organizations for and against revision have been formed; and it has
been a persistent issue in national political campaigns. Revision will
be a major political issue as long as controversy surrounds the content
of the Constitution and as long as emotions can be aroused over its
alien inspiration.
The outstanding development in the revision struggle has been the
Commission on the Constitution.39 Formed in 1957 after a bitter
battle in the Diet, the Commission operated for almost seven years
before its work was completed and its final report submitted.4" The
law establishing the Commission described its duties as follows: "To
add to the studies of the Constitution of Japan, to investigate and
deliberate on problems relating to it, and to report the results to the
Cabinet and through the Cabinet to the National Diet."'
In the beginning it was generally believed that the true mission
of the Commission was to produce recommendations which would
allow the government, controlled by the Liberal Democrats, to accomplish an extensive revision of the Constitution. However, although
"On the Commission, see Ward, The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects for ConstitutionalChange in Japan, 24 J. ASIAN STUDIES 401 (1965).
o For a brief summary of the final report plus the twelve volumes of appended
documents that accompanied it, see Maki, The Documents of Japan's Commission on
the Constitution, 24 J. ASIAN STUDIES 475 (1965).
11Id. at 475.
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it was clear from the beginning that a majority of Commission members favored revision, there was a core that firmly restisted it. The
chairman of the Commission and the leader of this anti-revisionist
group was Professor Kenz6 Takayanagi.
A very lengthy final report with voluminous supplementary reports
resulted from the Commission's work. The report did not recommend
revision, but it was made clear that a majority of Commission members did favor an extensive list of revisions. As required by law the
report was submitted to the Cabinet and placed under additional investigation by the influential Cabinet Bureau of Legislation; but four
years later, the report still had not been submitted to the National
Diet as the law required. Consequently, there is no indication that the
report was furthered the cause of revision.
The Commission on the Constitution has contributed to the Japanese constitutional style because its enormous collection of documentary
materials sheds light upon almost every facet of constitutionalism in
Japan since the end of the Second World War.4 2 This material constitutes the written record of the deliberations of the Commission and
its numerous committees and subcommittees. To the best of my
knowledge no other government has ever carried out such an exhaustive examination of its constitution. The long deliberations and the
resulting massive documentary legacy of the Commission, not only
provide material for a better understanding of every constitutional
issue confronting Japan, but also stand as a significant facet of the
Japanese constitutional style.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the short space of twenty years the Japanese have developed a
constitutional style with the following salient characteristics: a firm
commitment not only to maintain the present constitutional system,
but to prevent a return to any features of the old system; the conversion of broad principles into a working structure of government
and politics; the enjoyment of a wide range of fundamental freedoms;
the active defense of the Constitution and its system by intellectuals
with broad popular support; the systematic inculcation of knowledge
of the Constitution and constitutional problems into the society
through the operation of both formal education in the schools and
informal education through the mass media; a broad and effective
'See, Maki, supra note 40, for a complete description of all the published documents of the Commission.
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debate on a wide range of constitutional problems; and a national
government which, if not ideally responsible to the sovereign people,
has demonstrated that it is aware of and sensitive to the needs and
demands of the society it governs. Such a constitutional style means
that Japan has a viable constitution, viable because it has become a
part of the processes of Japanese society.
How was it possible for the Japanese to develop a new and complex
constitutional style in approximately two decades? To provide a definite answer may be impossible, yet the following four points may
constitute an approach to an answer.
A. The Creative Crisis of 1945-1952
More than twenty years after the fact it has become clear that the
crushing military defeat in the Second World War and the subsequent
military occupation, dominated by the United States, were not simply
events of great, indeed unprecedented, magnitude in Japanese history.
Rather, they were both the causes and the manifestations of a crisis
in the development of Japanese society, a crisis both truly creative and
partially destructive. It was a crisis not simply because of the trauma
of an overwhelming military defeat and the great physical suffering
and devastation arising from the massive military blows of the later
stages of the war; it was a crisis also because an occupying power
attempted successfully to eliminate certain features of the country's
political, social and economic structure. The Japanese people made it
clear that they either actively rejected those same features or passively
accepted their destruction, elimination or drastic modification.
The crisis was creative because in many respects the present state
of Japanese society is a marked improvement over anything in the
past. The world is familiar with Japan's economic miracle which is
characterized by a higher level of material well-being and comfort
than the Japanese have ever before enjoyed. Politically, the very fact
that Japan has a growing democracy reveals the acceptance and integration of what was regarded as an alien political system. Sociologically, the Japanese have welcomed or accepted, even generated, a
number of highly significant social changes. Although many Japanese
have expressed dissatisfaction with these creative developments, the
fact remains that they have become characteristic features of Japan
today.
The significance of this creative crisis to the development of a
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Japanese constitutional style is simply that the Constitution was
thoroughly woven into almost all aspects of Japan's changing society.
As emphasized earlier, no matter what the circumstances of the origin
of the instrument itself,-it was directly related to both the rejection
and the renunciation of a hated past, and the institution and integration of new patterns of social action which initially were only hopeful
parts of a new social order.
The prime consideration is not that the Constitution was the cause
of the creative aspects of the crisis, but the more modest, but not less
significant, fact that it was embedded in the whole process of the
creative -crisis.
B. PopularCapacity for PoliticalResponse
"Popular capacity for political response" means simply that in the
formulative stages of the development of the constitutional style there
was present in Japan's political society the potential for a broad, if
not universal, reaction to the issues raised by the Constitution. Realizations of this potential would include everything from the reaction
to the release of the draft revision in March, 1946 down to the current
controversy over revision.
What were the sources of this capacity? Clearly, one of the most
important was the existence of universal adult literacy. This was the
essential foundation for the communication of information and opinion
through the medium of the printed word, a process which, as already
noted, has been one of the outstanding features of the Japanese constitutional style. Closely related to literacy is the existence of an operating system of mass communication, the press, radio, motion pictures,
and recently television. These were the means by which the constitutional debate was deeply injected into Japanese political discourse,
ranging from conversation to demonstrations in the streets.
Of course, there was the additional fact of popular exposure to
politics and the political process going back at least to the decade of
the 1870's. Even though the authoritarianism of 1930 to 1945 was
antidemocratic and stifling to freedom of expression, it was also designed to get the population totally involved in the political process,
although that process was quite the reverse of a democratic one. However limited political participation in the constitutional democratic
sense may have been under the old system in comparison with what
has been developed since the end of the Second World War, the fact
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remains that the Japanese people were not ignorant of politics and the
political process. The development of the constitutional style was in
effect simply a very drastic change in the content of the political
discourse.
C. The InstitutionalBase
Implicit in the discussion of both the creative crisis and a capacity
for political response is an issue of paramount importance: the broad
institutional base upon which the constitutional style could be
erected.4 3 The educational system, three-quarters of a century old in
its modern form at the end of the Second World War, was not only the
fountain of universal literacy, but as emphasized earlier the means by
which the post-war constitutional generation could be nurtured on the
new Constitution. The system of mass communication was also an
established and effectively operating instrument of informal education.
The political parties, revived in the early stages of the occupation,
were prepared, even anxious, to seize upon the issue of constitutionalism in their competition for political control. Lacking as it was in
democratic provisions, the 1889 Constitution nevertheless had provided the Japanese with more than half a century of experience under
a constitutional system. In addition, the pre-1945 legal system was
thoroughly integrated into the old order. Therefore, it was a relatively
simple operation to revise the existing legal codes so that they would
be in conformity with a new constitution. Though hundreds, if not
thousands, of the provisions of the new legal codes were different
from those of the old, they were still part of a legal system which had
been a part of Japan's society for many decades.
It is precisely because there existed in Japan a solid and time-tested
framework of political, social and legal institutions that it was possible to develop a characteristic style in the operation of these institutions in relation to a new fundamental law.
D. Constitutionand Society
It is a truism of modern constitutionalism that a constitution can
be viable only if it conforms to the practices and values of the society
for which it is to be the guiding fundamental law. This truism has
emerged from the experience of the constitutional states of the West in
the modern world.
'I have applied this same point to the broader problem of the development of
democracy in Japan. See J. MAKI, supra note 22, at 30-32, 74-75.
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In the case of Japan it was the clearly apparent gap between the
new Constitution and Japanese society, history (both ancient and
modern) and tradition that led most observers to the not unreasonable
conclusion that the new Constitution might most accurately be described as an interesting experiment conducted by interested aliens.
The inaccuracy of this forecast was not the fault of those who made
it. Rather it must be traced to the lack of an historical parallel providing a basis for an evaluation of the whole process of integration
into a society of an "alien" constitution.
In the final analysis it is perhaps not inaccurate to state that the
development of a new Japanese constitutional style is a measure of the
recasting of Japanese society over the past twenty years, a recasting
which began under the impact of military defeat and the coercive
thrust of a foreign occupation but developed rapidly and most significantly due to the constructive and integrative response of the Japanese people themselves who have undertaken one of the broadest and
to date most successful tasks of social engineering that the twentieth
century has witnessed.

